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Abstract-Using confidential firm-level panel data from the :Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, we examine how the bilateral trade flows of 'C.S. 
multinational corporatmns (MNCs) and their Canad.J.M affiliates re-
sponded to U.S.-Canadian tariff reductions from 1983 ro !992. We find 
lt.<11t Canadmn affiliate sales to ilie Umted States are negatively correlated 
with Canadian tanffs, but U.S. parent sales to Canadian affihates have 
little association with Canadian tanffs. These results contraruct t.lte notion 
that Canadia.'1 tariff reductions would lead to a "hollowing out" of 
Canadian manufacturing. We also find substantial heterogeneity in Yl:NC 
responses to ta.qff changes within na.'TOwly defined manufacturing indus-
tries. Overall, bilateral trade liberalization is trade-creating, as U.S. MNCs 
integrated thexr North American production such that Canadian affiliates 
increased sales to the Umted States and reduced domestic sales. 
T HE decisions of multinational corporations (MNCs) about where to locate production have been at the 
forefront of the debate regarding free trade. As the recent 
debates in the United States over the NAFTA and in Canada 
over the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) showed, 
there is great concern over the question of whether MNCs 
systematically prefer to locate production in countries with 
lower wages and factor costs, as predicted by factor-propor-
tions theories of trade, or whether MNCs prefer to concen-
trate production in a single country to exploit economies of 
scale, as predicted by IO-based theories. The concern is that 
these tendencies wm be magnified if trade liberalization 
enables firms to easily ship goods that are produced abroad 
back to the United States (or Canada). 
At the heart of this debate is the notion that, when trade 
is liberalized, ali firms within the same industries or sectors 
of particular countries respond similarly based upon either 
the factor intensities of the products they produce or upon 
other characteristics of their production technologies (such 
as economies of scale). In this paper, we examine the extent 
to which trade liberalization induced U.S. MNCs with 
affiliates in Canada to adjust their production locations, and 
the extent to which these adjustments are predicted by 
characteristics of the industries in which the MNCs operate. 
Production-location decisions are inferred from trade flows: 
bilateral fl.ows to and from Canadian affiliates and their U.S. 
parents, Canadian affiliates' sales to unaffiliated buyers in 
the United States, and affiliates' domestic sales in Canada. 
Changes in these trade flows indicate, for example, whether 
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bilateral trade liberalization affected the amount of product 
that U.S. MNCs produced in the United States to sell to 
Canada or produced in Canada to sell locally or to the 
united States. 
There is considerable evidence that U.S. MNCs and. t.'Ieir 
Canadian affiliates organize their production in quite differ-
ent ways, even when they are in the same industry, at the 
same point in time, and facing the same prices. To illustrate, 
charts A through D in figure 1 show the four trade flows for 
affiliates in a single industry in 1983, 1988, and 1992 using 
confidential firm-level data from the BEA. To preserve 
confidentiality, we carmot revea1 the industry or the number 
of firms in the industry. However, the within-industry het-
erogeneity in trade dow patterns and the changes in trade 
flows between 1983 and 1992 are broadly representative of 
the industries in our sample. In charts A through D, the 
horizontal axis represents the ratio of each trade :fiow to total 
affiliate sales, (Ratios are specified in ranges of one-tenth.) 
The vertical axis gives the percentage of affiliates in the 
industry with flows in the specified ranges, So, for example, 
in chart D, we can see that, in 1992, approximately 44% of 
affiliates have Canadian sales in the range of 0.9 to 1, These 
affHiates are therefore selling nearly an their production 
locally. Note, however, that the 44% figure has dropped 
from nearly 80% in 1983-indicating that, between 1983 
and 1992, Canadian affiliates in this industry reorganized to 
sell less of their production locally. From the charts, con-
siderable organizational differences between MNCs are ev-
ident, particularly with regard to the two intrafirm trade 
:flows (charts A and B). We argue that such differences in the 
organization of production reflect mmbsenred differences in 
market power or technology, which cause firms in the same 
industry facing the sa."'TI.e prices to choose different config-
urations of production. The extent to which such choices 
differ systematically, both vvithin and across industries, is 
the principal focus of this research." In particular, we expect 
that MNCs within the same industry that organize produc-
tion quite differently prior to a tariff change may also 
respond quite differently to a tariff reduction. 
The causal link between finns' production technologies 
and their responses to trade liberalization can only be 
ascertained by estimating a structural model of MNC be-
havior that includes parameters of individual firms' technol-
ogy and product demand. ::'-Jo such estimated models exist in 
the empirical trade literature. Grubert and Mutti 0 991) and 
Brainard 0 995) discuss difficulties in previous empirical 
work in which researchers have essentially regressed indi-
cators of direct jnvestm.ent activity, such as MNC sales, on 
endogenous variables, such as MNC exports. Grubert and 
Mutti avoid this problem by examining the effect of exog-
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enous variables such as taxes, tariffs. and :per capita GDP on 
MNCs' capital stock. Similarly, Brainard (1993) examines 
the effect of variables such as trade a11d investment policies 
ami transportation costs on the share of total MNC sales 
a·~counted for by affiliate sales and exports. Using disag-
gregated panel data, we take a similar approach to Grubert 
and Mutti {1991) and Brainard 0993), but our aim is to 
examine the effect of changing tariff levels on MNC pro-
duction-location dedsions over time. 
Although earlier studies on the impact of tariffs on MNC 
decision-making (Horst, 1972; Grubert & Mutti, 1991) used 
aggregate andior single-period data, our study differs in two 
~~-,--,~-_Copyright© 2001. All rights reserved. 
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important dimensions. First, we use confidential firm-level 
panel data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to 
examine MNC responses to trade liberalization. Second, we 
examine the extent to which MNC responses to trade 
liberalization vary both across industries, and across firms 
within the same industry. 
From a theoretical point of view as well as from a policy 
perspective, it is important to know whether trade liberal-
ization affects all finns within particular industries in a 
similar fashion. For example, when governments administer 
trade policies (such as the Semiconductor Trade Agreement 
or the Multifiber Arrangement), they typically focus on 
particular industries that are considered to be vulnerable or 
to have been harmed by trade. However, if :most of the 
variance in adjustments to trade liberalization is intra- rather 
than interindustry, policies designed to protect vulnerable 
industries may be missing the mark. From a theoretical 
perspective, theories of the MNC (Dunning, 1979; Rugman, 
1981) suggest that idiosyncratic characteristics of firms such 
as the skills they possess or their reputation are an important 
determinant of their behavior in domestic and foreign mar~ 
kets. The extent to which such fum-specific characteristics 
may be important in explaining their response to trade 
libera!ization has never been tested. Here we examine the 
relative magnitudes of the variance in MNCs' responses to 
trade liberalization explained by characteristics of firms and 
characteristics of industries. 
By using firm-level panel data, we can examine the effect 
of tariff reductions on MNCs' production location decisions 
within and across industries. Previous work has typically 
used sing1e-period cross-sectional designs with industry or 
country-level data to examine the impact of tariff!> on 
MNCs' production location decisions.' For example, Culem 
(1988) examines the determinants of production location 
among industrialized countries between 1969 and 1982 but 
uses country aggregate data. Grubert and Mutti 0991) and 
Horst 0 972) examine the impact of tariffs on production 
locations using only a single year of aggregate data. Spe-
cificaHy, Horst {! 972) examines shares of U.S. exports and 
Canadian affiliate production for 18 2~digit manufacturing 
industries, a..11d Grubert and Mutti (1991) use country ag-
gregate data on 33 countries. Caves (1990) uses panel data 
from 1970-1979 to examine adjustments to Canada-U.S. 
trade liberalization, but his examination focuses on 4-digit 
industries rather ihan firms. More recently, Brainard (1993, 
1997) uses disaggregated data from the BEA Benchmark 
Survey to examine factor proportions and :market proximity 
explanations of MNC location decisions, but she too uses a 
single year of data. Because we examine changes in MNC 
1 Thompson's (1993) study 6ffers from other research on adJustments to 
tariff reductions in that she uses stock price data on Cooadian firms to 
measure the sectoral c,nd intraindustry abnormal returns that corre~pond to 
importc.nt events in i:he pa~sage of the Canada-U.S, Free Trade Agreement 
She does not examine the impact of tanff reductions on production 
location decisions per se, but she does find evidence of s1gnificant 
intramdustry variance in returns among firms in two-digit mdustries. 
production-location decisions using firm-level data over a 
ten-year period of time that includes both the Tokyo Round 
of the GAIT and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 
we can better identify the influence of tariffs on MNC 
production-location decisions. 
Specifically, we examine the impact of U.S. and Canadian 
tariff reductions on the production-location decisions of 
U.S.-based MNCs and their Canadian affiliates from 1983 
to 1992. The Canadian context is an interesting and relevant 
setting for examining the impact of tariff reductions on 
MNC production decisions. Because of the large share of 
Canadian manufacturing capacity owned by U.S. MNCs2 
and the ease of cross-border shipping, there was great 
concern in Canada that U.S. MNC affiliates would leave 
Canada and serve the Canadian market through exports 
originating in the United States (Crookell, 1990). Such 
divestment could take several possible forms. MNCs could 
exit the Canadian market altogether and simply replace 
local production and sales with exports from U.S. parents. 
Alternatively, MNCs could remain in the Canadian market 
but source most of the components in the products they 
make from the United States. This latter type of adjustment 
constitutes the phenomenon of "hollowing out" (Cohen & 
Zysman, 1987}. In manufacturing industries, it was widely 
predicted that U.S. MNCs would rationalize their Canadian 
operations by reducing the number of product varieties 
produced in each plant and increase plant-level economies 
of scale (Caves, 1990; Cox & Harris, 1985, 1986). Films 
within the same industries were predicted to respond simi-
larly based upon industry production technologies. 
The data set used in this paper is from the Benchmark and 
Annual Surveys of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad (USDIA) 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In this research, we 
use finn-level data that includes detailed information on the 
entire population of U.S.-based MNCs and their foreign 
affiliates from 1983 to 1992. Due to the confidentiality of 
the firm-level data, access is restricted by the BEA. How-
ever, the size of the sample and the relatively long period 
over which MNCs are observed enable us to rigorously 
examine a variety of unanswered questions in the empirical 
trade literature. ill this study, we use a panel of 701 major-
ity-owned, U.S.~based MNC parents and their Canadian 
affiliates in fifty manufacturing industrieso 3 The detailed 
microdata enable us to examine the relationship between 
tariff reductions and changes in MNC production~location 
decisions and the extent to which the latter are systemati-
cally explained by finn or industry characteristlcso 
2 Foreign ownership of Canadian manufacturing capacity peaked during 
the Trudeau years, reaching a high of 61% in 1970 (Bothwell, 1992). 
Today, foreign ownership of manufacturing capaci!:y is approximately 
40%, aliliough it varies cons!derably by industry (Rugmoo, 1989), At the 
end of 1971, U.S. investorn held 77% of the total foreign investment in 
Canada, down from 81% m 1967. 
3 T:.e 70l unique p:arent-aff!liate pairs are referred to as firms in the 
remainder of this paper unless 5pedfied ru; parents or affiliates, 
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In section II, we describe the econometric techniques 
used in the paper. Section m describes the data set used in 
the estimation, and section IV contains the empirical results 
for each of the four trade :flows. Section V summarizes our 
main findings and concludes. 
II. Econometric Framewo:rk 
The basic regression model used in our analysis is as 
follows: 
+ fZ" + V 11 (1) 
i = l, 2, ... , N; t = l, 2, ... T 
where 
J 
UTlt = L I(i Ej)UT;t 
;=! 
J 
CT,1 = L l(i Ej)CT11 
;=l 
and Ya is one of the following four trade flows for U.S. 
parent-Canadian affiliate pair i: 
1. sales from Canadian affiliate i to it:s U.S. parent 
2. sales from Canadian affiliate i to unaffiliated buyers in 
the United States (arms-length sales) 
3. sales from U.S. Parenti to its Canadian affiliate 
4. domestic ("Canadian") sales of Canadian affiliate i 
CT11 and UT,. are Canadian and U,S. tariffs in industry j 
at timet. The I(i E j) are indicator dummies for whether 
finn i belongs to industry j (j = 1, ... , l), so that the 
summation term picks up the releva.11.t tariffs. The vector Zit 
contains exogenous variables representing transportation 
costs, demand, relative factor costs, and other miscellaneous 
time effects. Specifically, Z1, includes real US. and Cana-
dian GDP and manufacturing wages, a measure of transpor-
tation costs in industry j at time t, a time trend, and-to 
capture time effects on the cost of capital-we include real 
U.S. interest rates and Canadian and U.S. price~eamings 
ratios. Variable selection and measurement is discussed in 
greater detail in section m. 
Because interest lies in examining the extent to which 
variation in MNC responses to trade liberalization are ex-
plained by firm and industry characteristics, the model must 
allow the slope coefficients on the U.S. and Canadian tariff 
coefficients to differ across firms and industries. Hence, {311 
and f3i2 , the firm-specific coefficients on the Canadian and 
U.S. tariffs in equation (1), are specified as 
where !3t and t32 are the mean tariff coefficients in the 
population of firms, and the ~:s capmre acro!;,s-fim1 heter-
ogeneity in tariff responses. 
In this type of model, we can estimate ilie population 
mean for each ~ and the variances of the {3/s and test the 
hypothesis that the variances of the {3/s are equal to zero 
(Hsaio, 1986). For the purposes of our study, this is not an 
interesting hypothesis. Trade theory suggests that aH the 
variance in the /3,'s should be across industry. not that it 
should be :zero. We can test this hypothesis by constructing 
estimates of the individual firm betas, a posteriori. and then 
by decomposing these betas iiltO across- and within-industry 
componen~s. 4 
In our estimated model, we also allow for heterogeneity 
in the time trend. Because the U.S. and Canadian tariffs 
have strong trends, it is possible that heterogeneity in the 
tariff coefficients might simply pick up the effect of tmob-
served time-varying factors (such as changes in technology 
or demand) on individual firms. (For example, because 
some firms grow over time oue to unobserved forces, a 
random coefficient on any trending vadab1e like tariffs 
would tend to pick up this feature of the data.) AU owing the 
trend coefficient to be random deais with this potential 
problem. 
FinaHy, we specify the error term Vu in equation (1) as 
consisting of two components: v11 = 4>, + e, 19 where q,, ~ 
N(O, u~) is a vector of unobserved time-invariant firm-
specific characteristics, while Ba is assumed to vary over 
time and across fimu;. The variance of €he firm-specific error 
component indicates how much of the across-firm vadation 
in the trade flows is due to unobserved characteristics of 
firms. Incorporating the error component and three random 
coefficients into equation 0) yields the ra.~dom effects 
model (2): 
Y,, = {3o + ({3, + 1-L~t)CTu + \!32 + J.L,2)UTu 
+ (/33 + T,)Trendt + f34Z,~ + !/:>, + s,t 
(2) 
where r, - N(O, ""*)is the randmn component of the time 
trend coefficient. Finally, we specify the time-varying error 
component as an AR(l) process: s 11 = peil-l + 'rim where 
TJu is i.i.d. over time and across firms. If the time-varying 
4 The procedure works as follows. Adopt the pnor that each firm-specific 
coefficient if distrib11~ed in the population with tl:::e mea& and va,-iance 
given by our e&timates. Ther., apply Bayes rule ao form the posterior 
density of the vector of firm-specific parameters. For each firm, solve fer 
the vector of firm-specific parameters that maximizes this postenor den-
shy conditional on the firm's observed behavior. We treat this as the a 
posteriori estim:>.te of the firm-specific p~~rameter values. G1ven such 
estmmtes fo:: each finn, we cam find the average of me firm-specific 
coefficients witliin each narrowly defined mmmfacturing mdustry; we call 
these fue industry effects. We can then decompose the total variance of the 
firm-specific parameters into acro~s- a11d W!thill-l!:.dustry variatio11. 
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error component is autocorrelated and we fail to account for 
it, the importance of the time-invariant error components 
will tend to be exaggerated, because those components 
would be the only means by which the model could generate 
persistence. Thus, given our focus on examining properties 
of me time-invariant error components, accounting for other 
sol!rces of persistence (such as adjustment lags) is impor-
tant. 
Because some MNCs organize their U.S. and Canadian 
production to produce and seH aB output ]ocaHy (for in-
stance, affiliates may produce and sell aU their output in 
Canada and not export to, or import from, the United 
States), a significant proportion of the Y,/s are equal to zero. 
Therefore, the use of OLS to estimate equation (2) is 
inappropriate. Rather, we treat equation (2) as a random-
effects Tobit model and estimate it using maximum likeli-
hood. Tobit models have the following form: 
Y~t = {3' Zu + Vu 
y,l= 0 
y,t = y~ 
if y'rr:.:;; o. 
if yt > 0. 
where z11 represents the ve.ctor of all covariates. In Tobit 
models, a change m z,1 has two effec[S. h affects the 
conditional mean of YTr in the positive (nonzero) part of the 
distribution, and it affects the probabiliry that the observa-
tion faUs in that part of the distribution (Judge et at, 1985; 
Greene, 1993). So, given the censoring. t.'le effect of z11 on 
Y:t is 
where <I> is a standard normal distribution function and(_~}(·) 
is the probability that y,1 is in the uncensored region. 
In a censored regression, OLS yields biased parameter 
estimates. If the model were estimated using on]y the 
observations with nonzero y11 values, Ehen only terms for 
which Vu > - f3zu would be induded in the sample. This 
results in a truncated normal distribution with a nonzero 
mean for the error term. To assess the extent of the bias, we 
report OLS estimates for the four dependent variables. 
The data set used in t.llls paper is from the Benchmark and 
Annual Surveys of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad admin-
istered by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. These surveys 
are the most comprehensive data available on the activities 
of U.S.-based MNCs and their foreign affiliates. For this 
study, we use the BEA data disaggregated at the individual 
foreign-affiliate ]eve! for each MNC fi·om 1983 to 1992; to 
isolate firm and industry effects, we use only single-industry 
affiliates (rhose affiliates that reported sales in only one 
industry). Because trade theory makes no predictions about 
production location of nonmaaufacturing industries and 
because many nonmanufacturing industries include non-
tradeables (such as retailing, real estate, and hotels), we use 
only manufacturing affiliates. The BEA data includes fifty 
manufacturing categories, and appendix A provides descrip-
tions of these industries along with mean tariffs and trans-
portation costs. The sample was also screened to include 
only majority-owned affiliates. 
Several alterations were made to the original sample to 
construct the paneL First, because the BEA conducts two 
different surveys (the Benchmark and Annual Surveys) with 
ditierent reporting requirements in terms of affiliate size, 
reported data are not avaHable for aU the affiliates through-
out !:he ten-year period. In particular, the Benchmark Sur-
veys, conducted in 1977, 1982, and 1989, in dude the whole 
population of MNCs and their foreign affHiates, and smaller 
affiliates are required to report. But, in the Annual Surveys, 
many of the small affiliates that reponed data in the 1982 
and 1989 Benchmark Sunreys are exempt from filing. In 
cases in which affiliates report data in a Benchmark Survey 
but are exempt from the Annual Surveys, the BEA carries 
them forward by estimating data.5 As a result of this sam-
pling procedure, most of the observations for smaHer affil-
iates were estimated data for most of the ten-year period. 
We decided to remove affiliates for which most of the data 
was estimated rather than reported. 
The initial screen was to exclude from the data set those 
affiliates that were observed multiple times but had only one 
reported (that is, not estimated) observation.6 The next step 
was to remove any estimated data for an affiliate that 
appeared prior to its first reported observation or subsequent 
to its last reported observation. The rationale for this is as 
follows: as we noted above, if an affiliate drops out of the 
sample be.ca11se it becomes exempt from reporting, the BEA 
carries the affiliate forward by estimating data. Because the 
Annual Survey data contains data on affiliates carried for-
ward from the 1982 and 1989 Benchmark Surveys, for 
many affiliates, the data observed in the middle of me 
sample period is largely reported, whereas the data at the 
beginning a.nd end of the samp1e period is largely estimated. 
Thus, we dedded to eliminate the estimated data at the 
beginning and end and keep only t.'J.e middle observations. 
After both screens, the total number of firm-year observa-
tions was reduced from 5,687 to 3,203--of which only 53 
were est]mated data pointr..7·8 
Data were removed four more times to arrive at the final 
sampk. First, affiliates in the same industry with the same 
parent were combined. Second, in 1987, SIC codes were 
5 :-l'ote !:hat the n!hvidual affiliates that are earned forward are small and 
are thus are not likely to have a s1gnificam 1n:pact on the REA's published 
data at the industry or country level. 
6 Note that an affiliate tha[ is observed only once but w;:h reported (that 
1s, not estm:mted) data survives thts scr<:en. 
7 Recail tha:: a "firm-year" observauon 1s a parent-aftihate pair observed 
:n a given year 
8 Note 6at the 53 e5timated data points that remained in :he sample after 
lhe mihai screens were all. bracketed by reported observatiOns. 
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revised for many industries, which resulted for the most part 
in codes being merged together.9 After recoding more than 
~' dozen industries for the entire sample period, affiliates in 
the same industry with the same parent were merged a 
~econd time. These two screens reduced the sample to 2,939 
observations. Finally, observations were removed for two 
industries in which there were no Canadian tariff data, and 
observations were removed in which affiliates reported zero 
salies. These final screens produced the sample used in this 
study with 2,881 firm-year observations on 701 finns in fifty 
manufacturing industries. 
Va..'":iables were included in the model to represent relative 
factor prices, relative demand, tariffs, and transportation 
costs. First. we indude a rado of real Canadian-to-U.S. 
manufacturing wages (CIU WAGE). T'.ll.en, rather than at-
tempting to measure the cost of capital in the two countries, 
we include both U.S. and Canadian price-earnings ratios 
and the U.S. real interest rate in the modeL while remaining 
agnostic about how these map into the cost of capital for the 
MNC and its aftiliate. 10 Only the U.S. interest rate was used 
due to the almost perfect collinearity of the two interest 
rates over the sample period. All nominal variables (includ-
ing the dependent variables) were normalized to 1990 U.S. 
CPI dollars. Canadian dollars were converted to U.S. dollars 
using annual nominal exchange rates from the IMF Inter-
national Financial Statistics Yearbook. 11 
Another natural control variable to capture changes in 
relative factor prices would be a real exchange rate (t'lat is, 
the nominal exchange rate times the ratio of the producer 
price indices (PPI) for the two countries). However, during 
our sample period, the PPl ratio is highly correlated with the 
nominal wage ratio. This induces a very high correlation 
(0.90) between the real exchange rate and the real-wage 
ratio, such that inclusion of borh variables caused severe 
9 If two codes existed for two s1milar industries rmor to 1987 and the 
codes were merged into a single code after 1987, we used the post-1987 
code for the entire ten-year period. Sinularly. If one code was broken mao 
two after 1987, we used the pre-!987 code for the enttre sample period. 
w If the cost of capital in the Umtcd Stateb and Canada differ, say, due 
to segmented llnanctal markets, then mclusion uf separate cost-of-capital 
variable~ :for each country woald be important, as the cost of capital in 
each country would affect the cap1tal intensity of production in that 
country. But we vrew such a scenano as implamable, aileast for MNCs. 
Nevertheless, even 1f there were no cost-of-capital differences between the 
t'IJ\o countries (rhat 1s, because ca]:n~al flows are unrestricted)--or 1f any 
such differences are rrrelevant to MNCs (because they can rnrse capital in 
either market)-1t remams true that the absolute level of the cost of capital 
may affect (i"Je production locatio::: decisions of MNCs. (For example, if 
world .::ost of capital rises, an M;";!C may shift to more labor-mtens1ve 
production and simulumeously sh1n production to lower-wage countries). 
Such an effect would be picked up joimly by the three cost-of-capital 
vanables we have included. 
11 Real 1.: S. mterest rates were obtamed by subtracting annual inflation 
rates from average yields on AAA corporate bonds Bond rate~ were 
obtamed from Moody's Industnal Manulll and mflation rates were ob-
tained from tile Survey of lli-rtmt Busmess. U S. manufacturing wage 
rates were also obtained from the Survey of Current Business. Canadian 
manufacturing wage rates were obtamed from Statistics Canada's Cana-
dian Economic Observer. t".S. P-E ratios were taken from Citibase, and 
annual data are twelve-mont.l-J. averages of quarterly data. Canadian P-E 
ratios were obtained from the Bank of Canada Review. 
coUinearity problems. Note that the movements in our 
real-wage ratio variable are largely driven by changes :i.n the 
nominal exchange rate. This moves substantially over the 
sample period, with the Canadian dollar faHing fmm 81 
U.S. cents in 1983 to 72 cents in 1986, rising to 87 cents in 
1991, and falling to 83 cents in 1992. 
U.S. and Canadian real GDP were used as demand 
shifters. Again, to capture relative changes in demand, we 
use a ratio of Canadian to U.S. GDP, CIU-GDP. To better 
account for differences in demand cydicaiity across differ-
ent industries, CIU-GDP was interacted with the broad 
industry group of the affiliate: industrial intermediate goods 
(If), industrial machinery (Ill!), consumer durables (CD) and 
consumer nondurables ( CN). The industry groupings are 
shown in. appendix B. AU variables in dollar val.ues were 
normalized to I 990 CPI dollars, and Canadian dollars were 
converted to U.S. dollars. 
U.S. and Canadian tariffs were measured as annual ratios 
of the value of duties paid in the United States (Canada) on 
imports of Canada (U.S.) goods in industry j at time t 
divided by the total value of imports to the United States 
(Canada) from Canadian (U.S.) importers in industry j at 
time t. 12 Similar measures at different levels of aggregation 
have been widely used in empirical work (Caves, 1990; 
Grubert & Mutti, 1991). Although the tariff measures used 
here do not reflect n.ontariff barriers and are still at a more 
aggregated level than that at which tariffs are actually 
imposed, they are more disaggregated than are those mea-
sures which are typically used in empirical work (Grubert & 
Mutti, 1991) and are longitudinal. During the ten-year 
period in this study, V.S. and Canadian tariffs dropped by 
approximately 62.5%, the liatter dropping from an average 
of nearly 8% to 3% and the former dropping from 4% to less 
than L5%. There is also considerable cross-sectional vari-
ation in tariffs, as can be seen in appendix A Mean U.S. 
tariffs for the ten-year period are 3.1 %, ranging from a high 
of 14.7% for tobacco products to a low of 0.11% in motor 
vehicles and equipment Similarly, Canadian tariffs average 
6.12% over aH industries for the sample period and range 
from a high of 30.27% in the beverages industry to 0.05% 
in agricultural chemicals. The striking cross-sectional and 
longitudinal characteristics of the U.S. and Canadian tariff 
structure indicate how much can be gained by using disag-
gregated, longitudinal measures. 13 
12 Tariff and transportation-cost S!C codes matched the codes in which 
the trade fl.ows were reported. Recrul that only single-industry affiliates 
were mduded m the sample. However, because most of the U.S. parents 
were large and diversified compames, i[ was not possible to limit the 
sample to smgle-imiustry p!!ren~s as '1'\"e]l. It was t.~Jerefore assumed !hat 
parent trade flows were in the same industry as the affiliate. In more than 
half the cases, the parent's major SIC code was t1.e same as the mdustry 
of the affiliate. 
13 V S. tariff data were obtained :fmm the Ui'lited States Census Bureau, 
and Canru.han tanff data were obtained from Statistics Canada. Canadian 
tanffs were reported in three-digtt Canadian SIC codes and had to be 
converted to U.S. SIC codes. SIC codes were then converted to ISI codes 
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TABLE 1.-CmmmoNAL AND :\'OR!VlAUZED MEANS ii.."'D VARIANCES 
c.s. 
CA Sales CA Anns- Parent 
to U.S. Length Sales to CA Sales 
Parent US. Sales CA in Canada 
Mean 19092 5526 B311 46108 
Vanance 3.9 X 1010 6.2 X 10" 2.1 X 1010 1 8 X 1010 
CondJ.twnal mean• 3!l457 16463 177(';4 47783 
Conditional variance 6.3 X 1010 1.7 X 109 2.7 X 1010 I 3 X 108 
Cond. normahzedb mean 0.1412 0 2323 01495 0.7540 
Ccnd. normalized 
vanance 00561 00858 0.0310 0.1271 
J 'M~ans and vanances are Londlttonal (cakulared llMng only non7ero observations) 
<}Normalized mean~ and "mmnces are also .;,und1t1onal and are calcutJ.ted by J1vubng the trade flow 
by each affi:haJe's tom! sale.-; averaged over the sample penod 
An annual measure of transportation costs for each three-
digit industry is based on data from the C".S. Census Bureau 
on freight and insurance charges as reported by exporters to 
the United States. The data can be further disaggregated by 
country of exporter" Thus, the measure used here includes 
the costs for Canadian exporters in each industry j into the 
United States" Because similar data is not available on the 
cost of exporting goods to Canada from the United States 
and no systematic differences in transportation costs were 
assumed to exist, the same measure is used for sales from 
U.S. MNC parents into Canada" The measure is expressed 
as a ratio of the value of shipment costs and insurance on 
imports in industry j at time t to the total value of shipments. 
Transportation costs average 1.03% across industries over 
the sample period, and range from 8A4% in agricultural! 
chemicals to dose to 0 in petroleum products. A priori, it 
was expected that higher transportation costs would reduce 
cross-border trade and increase the domestic sales of Cana-
dian affiliates. 
Finally, because affiliates in the sample varied signifi-
cantly in terms of size, the four dependent variables were 
normalized to mitigate problems of heteroskedasticity. For 
each affiliate. the four trade flows were divided by the mean 
total sales of the affiliate averaged over the sample period, 
However, results were not sensitive to this normalization. 
Table 1 gives the means and variances and conditional 
means and variances (using only the nonzero observations) 
and normalized means and variances. 
IV. Empiricai Results 
A OLS and Tobit Estimates 
We describe our empirical results in three sections. First, 
we contrast the OLS and Tobit estimates. Then, we discuss 
the economic meaning of the estimated ta.,;,ff effects, and, 
finally, we discuss the variance decompositions. Table 2 
shows the OLS and Tobit results for all four trade flows" The 
last two rows in table 2 give the R-squared values for the 
OLS regressions and the number of nonzero observations 
used by the BEA. ISI codes correspond roughly to the two- or three-digit 
SIC code level Correspondence tables are available from the authors 
for each trade fiow" As can be seen in the last row, the 
proportion of nonzero observations differs considerably 
between the four il.ows. For Canadian affiliate arms-length 
sales to the United States, only 33.6% of the observations 
are nonzero, hut for affiliate sales to V.S. parents, 62.7% of 
the observations are positive. This finding is consistent with 
Rugman's (1990) examination of U.S.-Canada trade pat-
terns in which he notes that approximately 70% of bilateral 
trade in manufactured products is accounted for by intrafirm 
sales of MNCs. 
The Tobit and OLS parameter estimates are very differ-
ent From the discussion in the previous sections, two likely 
sources of bias are affecting the OLS results" First, the 
truncation of the dependent variable at zero results in an 
error distribution with a nonzero mean which depends on !3, 
a, and x, and which is different for every observation. The 
second potential source of bias arises from the constraint of 
equal coefficients in the OLS estimates" In the Tobit panels 
in table 2, nine of the twelve random coefficients have 
standard deviations which are signif:cantly greater than 
zero. This implies that constraining these coefficients to be 
equal across finns may result in biased estimates. 
In table 2, panel 1, columns 1 and 2 report the Tobit and 
OLS estimates for Canadian affiliate sales to UoS. parents. 
As expected, the U"S. tariff coefficients are negative and 
significant, and the standard deviation of the random U"S" 
tariff coefficient is significant in the Tobit estimate. An 
interesting difference in the OLS and Tobit estimates for 
Canadian affiliate sales to U.S. parents is the marginal 
significance in the OLS model of all the GDP and relative 
wage coefficients. None of these estimated parameters are 
significant in the Tobit model. 
Co!umns 1 and 2 of panel 2 report the Tobit and OLS 
results for Canadian affiliate arms-lengt:.'1 sales to the United 
States" As expected, the V"S. tariff coefficient is significant 
and negative in both models, but the standard deviation of 
the random U.S" tariff coefficient is not significantly greater 
than zero. A comparison of t.1.e Tobit and OLS results shows 
striking differences in the estimates for the other parame-
ters. In particular, the Canadian ta..,;,ff coefficient, which is 
positive and insignificant in the OLS results, becomes sig-
nificant and negative in the Tobit results. Five other coeffi-
cients fiip signs as welL 
Columns ] and 2 of panel 3 give the Tobit and OLS 
results for U.S. parent sales to Canadian affiliates. The 
Canadian tariff coefficient is negative but achieves only 
modest sigmficance levels in both models, and the standard 
deviation of the random Canadian tariff coefficient is also 
not significantly greater t.'Ian zero. As we discuss in the next 
section, the magnitude of these estimates is quantitatively 
quite small, and this contradicts w1th the view that trade 
Hberalization would "hollow out" Canadian manufacturing" 
The U.S. tariff coefficient is insignificant in both the OLS 
and Tobit models. 
Copyright© 2001. All rights reserved. 
U.S.-CANADA TRADE LIBERALIZATION A.l\l"D MNC PRODUCTION LOCATION 125 
T4.BLE 2.-TOBJ'f AND OLS RESULTS FOR ThADE Flows 
CA Arms-Length Sale~ 
CA Sales to C.S. Parents co U.S. 
TOBIT OLS TOBIT 
CAN-TARIFF-1)1 0.0016 0 0032< -00132' 
(0.0022) (0.0009) (0.0049) 
US-T ARiFF-Ih -0.0194< -0 0175< -0 ()137" 
(0.0040) (0.0()20) (0 0077) 
CJU-WAGE -0.0017 -0.0092" -() 0027 
(0.0021) (0.0045) (C.0077) 
C/U-GDP IND 0.00!8 0.0831" -0.0261 
= CN (0.0239) (0 0428) (0 0732) 
C/U-GDP IND 0.01!8 0.0866b 0.0124 
=CD (0.0237) (0.0428) ({) 0733) 
C!U-GDP IND 0.0144 0.0899" 00024 
=II (0.0234) (0.0427) (0 0730) 
CIU-GDP IND 00154 0.089lb -0.0036 
= rM (0.0235) (0.0428) (0 0737) 
TRANS COST 0.0121" 0.0210'- -0.0079 
(0.0041} (0.0035) (0,0!42) 
TREND 0.0003 0 0186 -0.0122 
(0.0063) (0.0127) (0 0215) 
US !NT. RATE -0.0050 0.01 i8 -0.0265• 
(0.0058) (0.0114) (0.0160) 
CAN P-E -0.0003 -0.0096 -00018 
RATIO (0.0033) (0.0094) (1},0149) 
US P-E RATIO -O.OO!l -00049 00005 
(0.0011!) (0 0050) (0.0078) 
Constlmt-j30 0.1432" 0.1920 0.4084 
(0.0829) (0 2761) (0 3779) 
U(O!<sl) oom5 0.0136< 
(0.0035) (0 0039) 
u(p.,2) 0 0136° 0.0056 
(0.0040) (0 0162) 
u(,P,) 0 1522' 0.2989° 
(0.0087) (().0250) 
0'( T,) 0.0096< 0.0160" 
(0 0031) (0.0073) 
AR(l)p 0.6505< 0.5093-
(0.0309) (().0425) 
Model error O.H62< 0.1941 0.1929• 





S ..... pJe SilO IS 2,8&1 for aJ[es!lmOiums 
Nun:tbers m parenthe.ses are st:mdru'd erroN 
'S•gruficantlll: llle IO'It love! 
'S•gmfic&ni •t !he 5% level 
~: Stgnfficant &t the ll% 1evel 
Finally, columns 1 and 2 of panel 4 give the results for 
Canadian affiliate sales in Canada. In the Tobit results, both 
sets of tariffs are positive (U.S. tariffs are significant), and 
all the random coefficients have significant standard devia-
tions. The main contrast with the OLS results is that there 
the Canadian tariff coefficient is of the opposite sign and 
insignificant. From the last row of table 2, we find that the 
number of zero observations is small :!:or this trade flow. 
Thus, it seems likely that most of the bias in the OLS results 
for this trade flow arises out of the equal-coefficients re-
striction rather than from the truncated distribution. 
Before concluding this discussion, we note three common 
features of the full set of results. First, in an the Tobit 
models, the standard deviation of t;p,, the firm-specific error 
U.S. Parent Sales to CA CA Sales in Canada 
OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT OLS 
0.0013 -00024 -0.00l6b 0.0045 -0.0015 
(0.0009) (O.C.Ol8) (!).0008) (0.0035) (0.0017) 
-0.0125< 0.0028 0.0019 0 0199" 0.0322< 
(0 0020) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0069) (0.0038) 
-0.0023 -0.0003 0.0028 00032 0.0068 
(0.0045) (1).002!!) (0.0037} {0.0060} (0 0084) 
00030 00008 -0.0332 O.Ol32 -0.0333 
(0.0433) (0 0265) (0.0356) (0.0577) (0.0804) 
0.0!58 0.0107 -0.0262 -0.0020 -0.0473 
(0.0434) (0.0268) (0.0356) (0 0575) (0.0805) 
0.0101 0.0031 -00286 0.0003 -0.0427 
(0.0433) (0.0266) {0.0355) (0 0574} (0,0803) 
00089 0.0146 -0.0230 0.0068 -0.0413 
(0.0434) (0.0266) (0.0356) (0.0573) {().0805} 
OOI.J36 -0.(H31" -0.0129' -O.Ol35b -0.0305° 
(0 0036) (0.0037) (00029) (!W052) (0.0066) 
0.0002 0.0074 0.0026 0.0076 -0.0022 
(0 0129) (O.!Xl77) (0.0106) (il0l65) m.oz39) 
-0.0099 0Jl038 -0.0001 -0.0071 -00159 
(0 OlHi) (0.0062) {0 !.JC95) {0.0!29) (0.0215) 
-OJJ065 00006 0.0037 0.0078 0.0056 
(O.O"u95) (\),0063) (il0078) (0.0126) (0J)l77) 
-0.0027 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.00!5 -0.0012 
(0.0050) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0068) (0.0093) 
03889 -0.0047 0.0725 0.2911 04669 





0 1301< 0.1881° 
(00069) (0 0218) 
O.!H33" 0.0271< 
(0.0018) (00036) 
0 3316< () 5385" 
(0.0223) (0 0226) 
O.l%6 0.1048< 01614 0.2434° 0.3649 
(0.0010) (0.0024) 
0.0568 0.0552 () 06531 
967 2166 2780 
component, is significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
unobserved characteristics of MNCs account for a signifi-
cant portion of the variation in the levels of the trade :flows 
across firms that we documented in :figure 1. Second, as 
expected, the standard deviation of the random time trend, 
r,, was also significant at the 1% level in an of the Tobit 
estimates. This further impHes that unobserved characteris-
tics of MNCs explain a significant part of the firm-specific 
variation in the trade flows over time. However, our esti-
mates of the means and variances of the tariff coefficients 
were remarkably insensitive to whether the random time 
trend was included in the model. Third, the . ..\R(l) coeffi~ 
dents range from 0.33 Ro 0,65 and are an highly significant. 
These values are in a sense rai:her small, implying that 
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a The o;;ample mean of the Canad'1an. t~nff ro,; 5 852, and J.he samp~e st&r.~Jan:ii deVIatiOn l') .., 538 
b The sample n1.e.m. of the U S tanff ts 2 967, .md the sample -.tandJ.rd d~uL&tiOJI IS 2 4 ~9 
o: S1gmfic.mt at the 1()91, level 
'Stgmfu:.mt at the '\% level 
~ S1gmfi.::m st the 1% kwe~ 
transitory deviations in the dependent variable largely die 
out in a couple of years. Finally, most of the control 
variables were insignificant. The coefficients on transporta-
tion costs-the only control variable for which strong ef-
fects were expected a priori-were significant for two of the 
trade flows. However, the signs of the transportation-cost 
coefficients were in the opposite direction as expected for 
Canadian affiliate sales to U.S. parents and for Canadian 
affiliate sales in Canada. (This result is explained in greater 
detail in the next section.) 
B. Tariffs and Production Location 
Table 3 gives the expected sign patterns for U.S. and 
Canadian tariffs and the Tobit coefficient estimates for the 
four trade flows. For the three two-way trade flows (Oma-
dian affiliate sales to U.S. parents, Canadian affiliate arms-
length sales to the United States, and U.S. parent sales to 
Canadian affiliates), there is a strong prediction for the sign 
of the tariff of the receiving country. We would expect lower 
Canadian tariffs to lead U.S, MNCs to increase their sales 
from the United States to Canada. Similarly, lower U.S. 
tariffs should increase Canadian affiliate sales to the Vnited 
States., 
These simple two-way predictions were borne out for the 
three two-way trade flows. Using the sample means of the 
trade flows and the estimated coefficients, we can calculate 
the effect of tariff changes. For example, a one-percentage 
point drop in the U.S. tariff increases Canadian affiliate 
sales to U.S. parents by 13.8%. Interestingly, the effect of a 
drop in U.S. tariff levels is smaller for affiliate arms-length 
sales to the United States. For arms-length sales, a one-
percentage point drop in th.e G.S. tariff raises sales to the 
United States by 5.9%. 
Although the U.S. tariffs were significant and negative 
for both trade flows into the United States, several other 
results for the intrafinn and arms-length trade flows differ. 
First, transportation costs were unexpectedly significant an.d 
positive for Canadian affiliate sales to U.S. parents (see 
panel 1 in table 2) and were insignificant and negative for 
arms-length sales. Examination of the cross-sectional char-
acteristics of affiliate exports reveals that many are concen-
trated in industries with high transportation-costs such as: 
pulp, paper, and board mills (ISI 262); lumber and wood 
products (lSI 240); and stone, clay and concrete (JSI 329). 
CA Anns-I.-ength U.S Parent CA Sales 
us Sales Sales to CA m Canada 
? ') 
? ? 
-0 0132" -0 0024 +0.0045 
-00137< +00028 +00199° 
It appear& that Canada has a sufficiently large advantage in 
resource-based sectors to compensate for the relatively high 
cost of transporting the products. 
A second difference in the results for intrafirm and anns-
length sales is the positive (but marginaHy insignificant) 
Canadian tariff coefficient in the fonner and significant 
negative coefficient in the latter. A priori, we would not 
expect to see differences in the impact of Canadian tariffs on 
affiliates' decisions to export goods back to their U.S. 
parents or to unaffiliated buyers in the United States. H must 
be that underlying differences in MNC technologies lead to 
the systematic differences in the export pattern& that we 
observe here. Indeed, an examination of the cross-sectional 
characteristics of the intraflrm and arms-length trade flows 
reveals a greater concentration of manufactured and finished 
goods (such as farm machinery, construction machinery, 
and several types of refined chemical products) being ex-
changed intrafim1 as contrasted with a higher concentration 
of resource-based goods (such as primary metals and paper) 
being sold to unaffiliated U.S. hnyers.14 
A more interesting and unexpected result is the negligible 
effect of Canadian tariff reductions on U.S. parent sales to 
Canadian affiliates. Indeed, the coefficient on the Canadian 
tariff variable was unexpectedly small ( -0.0024), which 
implies a one-percentage point reduction in Canadian truiffs 
increases U.S. parent sales to Canadian affiliates by only 
1.6% on average. Furthem1ore, this coefficient attains sig-
nificance on]y at the 20% level. This result is surprising 
because of commonly expressed concerns in Canada that 
industry would be "hollowed out" if trade with the U.S. 
were liberalized (Crookell, 1990). Hollowing-out implies 
that, rather than exiting a market, firms maintain some local 
presence but import most of their value-added parts from 
abroad. In the case of U.S.-Canada trade, if U.S. MNCs had 
indeed hollowed out their Canadian operations, we would 
expect to see considerable increases in sales from U.S. 
parents to Canadian affiliates (along with probable reduc-
tions in sales from Canada to the United States) as a result 
of trade liberalization. This was not borne out in our 
findings, 
14 More detail on the composition of De trade flows is available from the 
authors. 
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Finally. table 3 gives the estimates for the Canadian and 
U.S. tariff coefficients for Canadia.i"l affiliate sales in Can-
ada. The U.S. tariff coefficient is positive and significant. A 
priori, there were no strong predictions for the effect of 
either tariff on Canadian affiliates' domestic sales. Our 
re;;u]ts indicate that a one-percentage point reduction in U.S. 
tariffs reduced affiliates' Canadian sales by 3.7%. Thi1., 
combined with our previous1y noted findings that U.S. tariff 
reductions were associated. with increases in affiliates' sale,; 
to U.S. parents of 13.9% and to unaffiliated U.S. buye~s of 
5.9%, suggests that with U.S. tariff reductions the affiliates 
became more export-oriented. This is intuitively plausible if 
MNCs restmctured to integrate U.S. and Canadian produc-
iion as a result of tariff reductions. 
The positive Canadian tariff coeffic~ent would. seem to 
support the tariff waH theory that, if tariffs are set high 
enough, firms substitute domestic production for imports. 
But this coefficient is insigmficant and small in magnitude. 
lt is true that some high-tariff Canadian inC:ustries would 
suffer from severe import penetration if those tariffs were 
lowered (good examples being the two highest tariff indus-
tries: alcohol and tobacco). But other high-tariff Canadian 
industries in which average affiliate sales are high include 
those industries that use resources in which Canada is 
a!:m.ndantly endowed. In general, industries with high affil-
iate sales in Canada seem to fall into three categories: 
high-tariff, regulated industries such as tobacco and alcoho!; 
resource-based industries such as food products, metals, 
furniture, and paper, in which either tari:i:Ts or trant.portation 
costs are high; and industries related. to the production of 
automobiles (such as industrial chemicals, meta[ stamping, 
glass, and engines a,'"l.d turbines) or agriculture (such as farm 
and garden machinery). Many of the industries in the second 
and third categories correspond with those identified by 
Rugman (1989, 1990) as having cmm.try-spedfic and finn-
specific advantages :n Canada. For political reasons, Cana-
dian tariffs may have been set high in industries that use 
abundant domestic resources to prevent firm~ from shipping 
out raw materials and. providing value-added activities 
abroad. This would help to explain our em·Her finding that 
lower Canadian tariffs are associated with increased arms-
length sales to the United States-such sale~ being more 
likely in resource-based industries. 
Our findings in this section showed that reductions in 
U.S. tariffs led to increased Canadian production for export 
to the United States but lower Canadian production for 
domestic sales. These findings are con:-istent with the pat-
tern (for one industry) !!hown in charts B and D of figure l, 
wherein the proportion of affiliates' total sales destined for 
L~e local market shrink<; considerably between 1983 and 
1992, but th.e proportion of affiliates' sales to U.S. parents 
increases by nearly as much. 15 Similarly, lower Canadian 
15 As mentmned earlier, t.'he reorgamzanon depleted in ligwe l is broadly 
revrescntatn e of the mdusmes m our sample Indeed, Canadian affiliate 
sales to U S parents as a percentag<! of total affilmte sales increased from 
tariffs led to a small increase in U.S. sales into Canada, a 
larger increase in affiliate arms-length sales to the United 
States, and little reduct:on :n Canadian production for do-
mestic sales. Overa]t we find that trade Hberal.ization ap-
pears to h~ve been trade-crea[ing, as Iower tariffs increased 
!Jilateral trade flows, but Wt~ i:nd no evidence that reduced 
Canadian tariffs led to a substantial increase in U.S, parent 
saies to Canadian affiliates, as would be expected in a 
hollowing-om scenario. 
A possib~e challenge to our findings z.rises because our 
random-effects Tabit mode! identifies tariff coeffidents 
from both cross-sectional and over-time variation in tariffs 
and trade flows. It is pm,sible that a negative cross-sectional 
correlation between tariffs and trade tlows existed prior to 
trade liberalization, but fum trade liberalization led to no 
cD.ange in trade fiows. In that case, our estimated tariff 
coefticiems i.n the trade flow equations are still negative, 
solely because of the negatlve cross-sectional corre]ation 
between tariffs and trade flows induced by the initial con-
ditions.16 
The typical way to deal with this type of problem is to 
estimate a fixed-effect:-: model. The fixed effects would pick 
up time-invariant influences on the trade flows, and the tariff 
coefficients would pick up ('nly the association between 
tariff changes and trade :flow changes. Unfmtunately, fixed-
effects Tobit models are inconsistent with small T. which is 
the situation here, and their estimation i.s prohibitively 
computationally burdensome. However, h1 the present case, 
a sensible dternative is to include the initial period (1983) 
preliberaliza~ion tariff Ieve1s a~ additional covariates in the 
Tobit model. Suppor,e that, prior to trade liberalization, 
tariffs were set low in industries with large trade flows and 
vice versa. Suppose further that, as tariffs were lowered 
with trade liberalization, this basic trade fl.mv pattern re-
8.36% m 1S!!B to 10.47% in 1992. SJmilarl)', the raM of Canadian affiliate 
rums-length U.S sales &~ a percentage of Kota! affi!:ate sales mcreased 
fwm 7 07o/c in i983 to 9 35% m 1992. As m fig11re 1, Canadian affiliates' 
Canadum ~:~les las a percen~age oftutal sales fell from 76.75% in 1983 to 
70A6% in 1992 Across all JI~dn~tnes, the }lZJtem 1s dearly one of 
l!1Creasing Car:adian affi!mte exp():O:. -on entatiOn. Bilateral trade also in-
crea~ed w11h trade liber.th.~:at:on· U.S parent sales to Canadian affiliates as 
B. percentage of 1otv.i C:madianaffilmte sales m<.Teasd from 9 5% in 1983 
to 12.87%. m 1992. 
' 6 A scenarro that would generate such a pattern is as fo!iows. Suppose 
m each mdustry that there exist' a ch.rractenstu:: organization of lMNC 
production thm h fixed over t!me. That !S, some mdusmes require large 
!wo-wa:y trade fl!ows (~oth mtrafim1 and arms-length) whereas otters do 
no!, and that the magmtude of ilie~e now:> Js stable over t1me (except for 
H.hosyn·~rahc, year-to-year lluctllahons) Further suppcse that, through the 
polillcal process. prelibemhzatinn t.l.\'lff levels were set low in Jm:lusti"Jes 
that reqmrc large trade llo\'VS, and v1ce versa Th1s scenario has a negatJ.ve 
..:ross-sectioi:al correlatiOn bet·ween t.a:<ff~ and trade flow~. but trade 
hberahzatron lead~ to no change in the rr:tde fto·w~ A[Jother, perhaps more 
plausible, scenario anses 1f adJu~tmeN co;ts m production are substantial, 
~o that trace flows r~:tpond very slov:rly to tariffs. Then, if preliberal.izarion 
tariff levels vvere set low r:;. mdustnes w1th large trade flows, our ooff 
coefficu~nts m&ty be largely p1clmg up the negative cmss-secnonal corre-
latJOn mduced by the imhal comiltions, rather t'too any ch:mge in trade 
flow~ over t;me Note, however, that neither of these scenarios seems 
con~istent with the data pattem~ exhibited m figure 1, o: th.o aggregate 
statistks d1scussed m footnote 15. 
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TABLE 4.-U.S. Al\'D CANADIAN TAR!I'F CollFF!CIENT ESTIMATES CmmmmiAL ON 1983 TAIUFPS 
CA Arms-Length U.S. Parent Sales 
CA Sales to U.S. Parents U.S. Sales to CA CA Sales 111 Canada 
U.S. ta!lff 
Canadian tanff {1 983) 
a Sl,gnifiCBint at ~he 10% level 
" S1gmficant at the 1% tevet 





















-00024 -00026 0.0045 -0.0003 
(il0018) (0.0025) (0 0035) (0.0048) 
OJlQ28 0.0001 0.0199< 0 016':)b 
(0.0034) (0.0042) (().0069) (0.0080) 
-0.0013 0.0025 
(() 0025) (0.0049) 
00068 0.0105 
(11.0042) (().0085) 
TABLE 5.-PEitCEl\'TAGE OP VARIANCE l'l RANDOM El'FECTS EXPLAENED BY WITH!?\- AND ACROSS-OOUSTRY EFFECTS 
CA Sales to USP CA A-L U.S. Sales USP Sales to CA CA Canadian Sales 
Within Across Withm. Across W1thm Across W!!hin Across 
Canad!&."l tariff up,.a 82.6% 17.4% 83.4%• 16.6%' 78.1% 21.9% 80.5%' 19.5%• 
U.S. tariff Uj.LJ2 84.3%• 15.7%• 83.4% 156% 83.2%• 16.8%' 85.3%' 14.7%• 
Time trend u,-, 82.3% 17.7% 78.5% 21.5% 86.3% 13.7% 73.2% 26.8% 
Firm effect uq:,, 85.8% 14.2% 7!1.8% 21.2% 776% 224% 756% 24.4% 
C A soles !n USl' are Canodt8l1 affil!ares· sale• to lJ S parent• CA A-L lJ S sales are orms-lengih '"'"'· USP •ooos to CA ""' US. paren"' sal<s ro Cmaman olnbates, and CA Canadl:m sale• = !he affil'"te'' 
sales m Canada 
a Denotes 'l:grufirant tanff-ccefhc1ent v~ance~ 
mained unchanged. In that case, the 1983 tariffs should be 
correlated with trade flows. But, conditional on the 1983 
tariffs, the post-1983 contemporaneous tariff levels should 
be uncorrelated with the trade flows. 
Table 4 reports the estimates of the tariff coefficients for 
models that include the 1983 tariff levels as additional 
control variables. Note that the 1983 tariff levels are in all 
cases insignificant. Furthermore, the coefficients on the 
contemporaneous tariffs are little affected by their inclusion. 
The key coefficients on U.S. tariffs in the equations for 
affiliate sales to the U.S. parent and the affiliate domestic 
sales equations remain highly significant The current tariff 
coefficients in the equation for affiliate arms-length sales to 
the U.S, do lose their significance, but this is due primarily 
to an increase in their standard errors. 
Based on these results (and the aggregate statistics re-
ported in footnote 15), we conclude that there is strong 
evidence that trade flows are actually increasing as tariffs 
fall. We are not just picking up a cross-sectional correlation 
that arises because industries with larger trade flows had 
lower initial tariff levels prior to trade liberalization. In the 
next section, we examine the extent to which heterogeneity 
in MNC trade flow adjustments is explained by character-
istics of the industries in which the MNCs operate or by 
idiosyncratic fum characteristics. 
C. Variance Decompositions 
In section II, we indicated that, from estimates of the 
Tobit models, we could construct estimates of the individual 
fum and industry betas a posteriori, We can examine th.e 
relative magnitude of firm and industry effects in MNC 
responses to tariff changes by decomposing the variance of 
the random coefficients into within- and across-industry 
variance, Schmruensee (1985) used a similar approach to 
evaluate the relative contribution of firm and industry ef-
fects to the total variance in firm profitability. We depart 
here from the standard variance components models in that 
we decompose the variance in the random coefficients in 
addition to the unexplained error. This aHows us to evaluate 
the relative importance of firm and industry effects in MNC 
responses to changing tariff levels. 17 
In table 5, we report the percentage of variance in the 
three random coefficients and the firm effect explained by 
within-industry and across-industry variation. As can be 
seen in panels 1 through 4, within-industry {:firm) effects 
explain much more of the variance in the random tariff 
coefficients, time trend, and firm effect than do across-
industry effects. 18 With regard to the tariff coefficients, 
across-industry effects explain only approximately 15% to 
17 It is L'!lportant to note that out a posteriori estimate~ of the firm-
specific betas are based on a fairly small number of observations per f,rm. 
Recall that there are 2,881 finn-year observations on 701 affihares, so the 
average number of observations per affiliate is a little over four. The main 
reason for this is mat small affiliates lyp!caily do not report data for every 
year in the sample period, as they are not always requm~d to report. In 
using a Bayesian updating r.1le to esnmate the firm-specific betas, we start 
from a prior mean on the betas that is ~he same for all firms. Because m 
man} cases a fa1rly small number of observatJ.ons are used to update diose 
mean~, the posteriors are compressed towards the means T'rds reduces 
both the Within- md ;o.cross-mdustry vanances of the firm-specific betas. 
However, we see no a pnori reason to expect that either component of the 
v?.riance wouid be relatively more compressed. Thus, we hope that our 
estimates of ilie fraction of variance due to each so~~rce are not misleading. 
StilL this issue should be revisited when a longer panel is avaEabte. 
18 We also estimated versions of om models m which the nmdom 
coefficients were restricted to be homogeneous within indu:.tries (as trade 
theory woUJid suggest). For Ill! fow trade flows, this led to very substillntiat 
deteriorauon in the likelihood :functions, providmg further evidence of 
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FIGU!lli 2.-FtRM·SI'ECIFIC U.S. TARIFF COEFFICIE!\"TS FOR CANADIAN 
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25% of the variance across finns. These results imply that 
firms widrin the same industry respond quite differently to 
tariff changes, presumably because of idiosyncratic firm 
characteristics such as differences in technology or organi~ 
zation. Such a finding is counterintuitive in the context of 
trade theory, in which factor-based or technological charac-
teristics of industries determine adjustment pattems. 19 Of 
course, if industries were defined more narrowly, the across 
variance would increase relative to the within vmance, and 
in the limit each firm defines its own industry and all 
variance is across. But it is a!so true that, as industries are 
defined successively more narrowly, both neoclassical and 
IO-based trade theories become meaningless. 
To illustrate the heterogeneity of firm betas in a single 
industry, figure 2 shows the U.S. tariff coefficients in the 
industrial chemicals industry for Canadian affiliate sales to 
U.S. parents. The horizontal axis represents the size of the 
estimated betas (the range in this industry is from -0.04255 
to -0.0037, and lhe mean industry beta is -0.01879). The 
vertical axis gives the frequency of firms with betas within 
the specified range. Recall that !he overall mean beta across 
all firms in an industries is -0.0194. 
Although there is much ]ess variance across industries in 
tariff coefficients, some interesting differences do emerge 
among the tlrree two-way trade flows. For instance, from a 
factor-proportions standpoint, one would expect to see Ca-
nadian affiliate sales to the United States (both arms-length 
and to U.S. parents) increase in industries in which Canada 
is relatively factor abundant And, indeed, the U.S. tariff 
coefficients for Canadian affiliate sales to the United States 
(both to U.S. parents and arms-length buyers) are among the 
largest i.n magnitude in: fumit.Jre and fixtures (250); pulp, 
paper, and board mills (262); paper and allied products 
(265); leather products (310); and bakery products (205). 
These industries correspond with those identified by Leamer 
(1 984) as resource-abundant industries in Canada. However, 
substantial v.ithm-indust.ry heterogeneity. The results of the industry-level 
estl.mations are available upon request from the authors. 
19 To put tl:!e results in a broader context, one might note, for instance, 
that human-cap1tlll. earnings functions typically can explam only 20% of 
f:~e variance of log earnings across individuals based on education and 
expenence differences, and yet the human-capital thoory is considered 
qmte powerful. 
other industries with high U.S. tariff coefficients for Can.a-
dian affiliate sales to the United States (both arms~length 
and to U.S, parents) include: preserved fruits and vegetables 
(203); textile mill products (220); and soap, cleaners, and 
toilet goods (284). It is not obvious that Canada would have 
a comparative advantage in these industries, but these in-
dustries do have in common the feature of high initial U.S. 
tariffs. 
V. Discussion and Condusionr. 
The results presented :i.n the previous sections dearly 
demonstrate the importance of tariff reductions to MNC 
production-location decisions. Reductions in U.S. tariffs led 
to greater affiliate production for sales into the United States 
(both to parents and to unaffiliated buyers) and reductions in 
affiliates' Canadian sales. Similarly, reductions in Canadian 
tariffs had a p.t"1sitive but unexpectedly small relation with 
U.S. parents' sales into Canada. The surprisingly small 
impact of the Canadian tariff on U.S. MNC sales into 
Canada contradicts the conventional wisdom in Canada that 
free trade with the United States would lead to a hollowing-
out of Canadian industry. 
Additionally, we find that firms within narrowly de-
fined industries responded quite differently to tariff 
changes. Such a pattern has not previously been demon~ 
strated empirically. From a theoretical standpoint, this 
result should not simply be interpreted to mean that 
adjustments to trade liberalization were primarily of the 
intraindustry type originaily modeled by Grubel ( 1970) 
and others. Theories of intraindustry trade stm predict 
that industry characteristics such as economies of scale 
and existence of differentiated products wm be the pri-
mary determinant of adjustment patterns. We would 
therefore expect, if these theories held, that there would 
be greater differences between industries in adjustments 
than within industries (because technologies differ from 
industry to industry). Instead, our finding that firm char-
acteristics exp!ained more of the variance in adjustments 
points to a potentially different explanation for produc-
tion-location choices: one based upon characteristics of 
firms such as their international configuration of technol-
ogy. From a policy standpoint, such a finding implies that 
government action that is designed to protect vulnerable 
sectors from trade liberalization might be altering pat-
terns of domestic competition rather than helping entire 
industries. 
REFERENCES 
Bothwell, Rober<, Canada and the United States: The Politics of Part-
nership (New York: Twayr;e Publishers, 1992). 
Brainard, S. Lad, "An Empirical Assessment of the Factor Proportions 
Explanation of Multinatiouru Sales," NBER working paper no. 
45!!3 (1993). 
--, "Comment on R. Lipsey: Outward Direct mvesttnent and the 
U.S. Economy."' m M. Feldstein, J. R. Hines, and R. G. Hubbard 
{Ed~.). The Effects of Taxation on Muitinational Corporation.r 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press. !995). 
130 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
--, "An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration 
Trade-off between Multinanonal Sales and Trade," Amencan Eco-
nomic Review 87(4) (1997), 520-544. 
Caves, Richard E., Ad;ustment to lnternatioiUll Competition (Ottawa: 
Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1990). 
Cohen, Stephen S., and John Zysman, Manufacturing Matters: The Myth 
of the Post-Industrial Economy (New Yorlc: Bl!llic Books, 1987). 
Cox, David, and Richard G. Harris, ''Trade Liberalization and Industr:.ai 
Orgooization: Some Estimates for Canada," Jo~ernai of Political 
Ecooomy 93(1) (1985), 115-145. 
--, ''A Quantitative Assessment of the Economic Impact on CMada 
of Sectoral Free Trade wifu the United States," Canadian Jm<mal 
of Economics 29(3) (1986), 377-394. 
Crookell, Harold, Canadum-American Trade and Investment Under the 
Free Trade Agreement (New York: Quorum Books, 1990). 
Culem, Claudy, "The Locational Determinants of Direct Investments 
among Induslriahzed Coootries," European Economic Review 
32(4) (1988), 885-904. 
Dunmng, John H., "Explaining Changing Patterns of Internawmal Pro-
duction. l11 Defense of the Eclectic Theory," Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics 41(4) (1979), 261-295. 
Greene, William H., Econometric Al'.alysis, 2nd ed. (New York: Macrrni-
lan, !993). 
Grube!, Herbert G., "The Theory of Intrli-Industry Trade," in I. A. 
McDougall and R. H. Snape (Eds.), Studses in International Eco-
oomics (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1970). 
Grubert, Harry, and John Mutt., "Taxes, Tariffs and Transfer Pricing in 
Multinational Corporate Dedswn Makil'lg," this REVIEW 73(2) 
0991), 285-293. 
Herst, Thomas, "The Industrial CompositiOn of U.S. Export.~ rnd Subsid-
ian Sales to the Canadian M~rrket," f.merican Ecrmomic Rev1ew 
62{1) (1972), 37-45. 
-- , "Exports, Imports, and the Balance of Payments," in C. Fred 
Bergsten, T. Horst, and T. H. MorM (Eds.), American Multmation-
als and the American l'lterests (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 
:978). 
Judge, George G., W. E. Gnffiths, R. C. Hill, H. Lut.lcepohl, and T. Lee, 
The Theory and Practice of Econometrics, 2nd ed. (New York: 
John Wiley and Sor:s, 1985). 
Leamer, E. E., Sources of Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence 
(Cambn.dge: MIT Press, 1984). 
Rugman, Alan M., lnsuie the Multmationafs: The Econom1cs of Internal 
Markets (London: Croom Helm, 1981). 
--, (E.!i.) lnternatwnal Business in Canada: Strategies for Manage-
ment (Scru:borough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Canada, Inc., 1989). 
--,Multinationals and Canada-Umted States Free Trade (Columbia, 
SC: Umversity of South Carolina Press, 1990). 
Schmalensee, Richard, "Do Markets Differ Much7," American Economic 
Rev1ew 75(3) (1985), 341-351. 
Thompson, Aileen J., "The Anticipated Secaoral Adjustment to the Can-
ada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event Srudy Amily-
sis," Canadtan Journal of Economics 26(2) (1993), 253-272. 
Copyright© 2001. All rights reserved. 
U.S.-CANADA TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND MNC PRODUCTION LOCATION 131 
APPENDIX A 
iNDUSTRY AVERAGE U.S. AND CANADJMJ TARIFFS AND 'TRANSPORTATION CosTS 
I:'\D l.ndm>try Descnptllcn U.S. Tanff Canruhan Tanff Tn.msCost 
201 Meat products and packagmg 0.82% 1 81)&.7(, 0.41% 
202 Dairy products ami processmg 661% 830% 3 8Q% 
203 Preserved fnnts and vegetables 7 29% 5.91 o/c 125% 
204 Gram mill products 2 33% 472% L34% 
205 Bakery products 056% 5.32% 044% 
208 Beverages 3.08o/c 30.27% 101% 
209 Other food and kindred products 330% 398% lOl% 
210 Tobacco products 14.74% 24.83% 0.87% 
220 Texnle rmll products 8.11% 13.:!7% 0.64% 
230 Apparel and othe:r textile products 1056% 2082% 0.71% 
240 Lumber and vvood products 043% 256% 401% 
250 Fum1ture and fixture; 172% 'U5% 066% 
262 Pulp. paper, ru~d board mtlis 0 lli% 3.31% 259% 
265 Other paper and allied products 2.29% 6.49% Oll4% 
270 Newspapers, pnntmg, and pubhshmg 3.15% 1.4!<;0 1.32% 
281 Industnal chemicals ru~d synthetlcs 3 50% 3 ,:,1% 2.22l-/O 
283 Drugs 3.14% 5.C5% 0.37% 
284 Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 4.64% 1073% 062% 
287 Agncultural chenucals 023% 005% 844% 
289 Chemical produc1s, n.e.c. 2.79% 5.48% 071% 
299 Petroleum and coal products 4 52% 0.91% 0.00% 
305 Rubber products 3 32% 5.95% 0.69% 
308 M!scel!ane,>us plastics products 4.34% 8 87'/i 070% 
310 Leather and leather products 5 77% l() 83'7<. 0.72% 
321 G!a;s products 2.03% 4.56% 0.59% 
329 Stone, clay, anJ concrete 2.11% 379% 239% 
331 Primary metal mdllstries, ferrou~ 334% 4.38% 112% 
335 Pnmary metal mdustne~. nonreum.1s 2.27% U9% ()42% 
341 Met.!.l cans, forgmgs anrl stampings 0.65'7~ 612% 1.27% 
342 Cu!lery, h&rdwne. and screw products 2.23% 7.23% 0.58% 
343 Heatmg eqUipment and plumbmg fixmres 3 91% 9.65o/c 0.79% 
349 Metal services products, ordn<Lnce, n.e c 2.3fl<k 5.79% 060% 
351 Engmes and turbmes 146% 9.~2% 0.15% 
352 Farm and garJen madunery 0.19'}[- 0.11% 079% 
353 ConsttuctJOil, mmmg, and machmery 196% 338'* 0.32% 
354 Metalworking machmery 3.36'k· 5J57~1 0.34% 
355 Spec1al mt\usrry machinery 2.78% 316% 0 31% 
356 General mdustnal maclunery 2.25'1\: 320% 0.43% 
357 Computer and ofllce eqmpme11t 0.5l'if 1 08'/l: 077% 
358 Refrigeration and serv1ce indusrry machinery 245'if- 4 28'ib 0.40% 
359 Indu3tnal and ccmmerc!al machinery. n.e.c. 2.16o/c 267% 061% 
363 Household appliance> 2639fcl 8.82% 0.76% 
366 Household aud1o and v1deo and commullications 3.71% 4 55<1(, 0.48% 
367 Electromc components atid accessories \.92% 679% 078% 
369 E!ectr1cal machinery, n e.c. 2.38% 411% U.44% 
371 Motor velucle:, and eqwpment 0.~1% ()37o/c 0.39% 
379 Other trru~sporta!mn and eq1upment 0 51'/h 1 7l'kJ 022% 
381 :'Vleasuring. scu~ntlfic, and opttcal mstrurnents 2.1 9')1c 2 j(jq, 035% 
384 Med1cal mMruments and supplies 446% 1 !19% Q 4QCk, 
390 Mrs.;ellaneous manufacmnng indm.mes 3.66% 640% 0.50% 
AVERAGES 3.10% 612% 1.()3% 
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APPJENDJX l3 
INDUSTRY CATEGORlES A:t-."D OBSERVATIONS 
Total Indi Vl(!ual 
JND Observations Category 
201 3 CN 
202 5 CN 
203 11 CN 
204 22 CN 
205 lO CN 
208 46 CN 
209 75 CN 
210 22 CN 
220 57 II 
230 70 CD 
2-W 6! II 
250 58 CD 
262 66 n 
265 70 II 
270 80 I1 
281 169 H 
283 !31 CN 
284 102 CN 
28'7 13 II 
289 121 II 
299 3 II 
305 59 II 
308 94 u 
310 14 CN 
321 3B li 
329 57 li 
331 74 ]l 
335 54 II 
341 l9 II 
342 46 II 
343 83 IM 
349 Hll J:M 
351 10 IM 
352 3 KM 
353 65 I"M 
354 41 IM 
355 47 IM 
356 44 IM 
357 16 IM 
358 59 KM 
359 t3 IM 
363 28 CD 
366 34 CD 
357 63 CD 
369 154 CD 
371 196 CD 
379 53 CD 
381 63 IM 
384 43 IM 
390 98 CD 
CN are con~um..::r nun-durable-; CD are consun::ter durables II are mdnstttal mtermednate'i E:M are 
mdustna£ machmcry 
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